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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 27, 2010, a former deputy chief of a police station
became the first person in Japan’s modern legal history to be formally
indicted by a citizen’s panel, called the Prosecutorial Review Commission
(PRC).1 Historically, until then, Japanese prosecutors had been the only
party with the legal power and authority to issue an indictment in criminal
cases. This criminal negligence case, known as the Akashi Stampede
incident, left eleven people dead and 247 people injured. Despite
significant public calls for the deputy chief’s prosecution, the Prosecutors
Office made the decision numerous times not to indict the deputy chief.2
Public dismay followed the decisions not to indict. The Kobe
PRC of Hyogo Prefecture, which is just west of Japan’s second largest
city of Osaka, finally recommended the indictment of former Deputy
Chief of the Akashi police station Kazuaki Sakaki for professional
negligence resulting in deaths and injuries.3 The PRC’s recommendation
was its second public demand for prosecution since the revision of the
PRC Law took effect. The first PRC indictment against a police officer
was returned by the same Kobe PRC in July 2009.4
According to the new PRC Law, the second PRC
recommendation for prosecution is legally binding, thereby prompting the
1

Ex-police Officer to be Charged over Stampede in Line with New System, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, Jan. 27, 2010 [hereinafter Ex-police Officer] (discussing the use of the PRC to
indict Kazuaki Sakaki and two police officers for the death of eleven people).
2
Id.
3
‘Forced Indictment’ a Heavy Responsibility, DAILY YOMIURI, Jan. 29, 2010, at 2
(agreeing with the indictment so that the facts of the tragedy may be revealed and
determine who was at fault).
4
Ex-police Officer, supra note 1.
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formal criminal prosecution of a suspect, whom the Japanese prosecutor
previously decided not to indict.5 In other words, the PRC has emerged as
a popular legal institution with the power both to challenge critically the
propriety of a prosecutor’s indictment decision and to reverse the
government’s decision on certain criminal matters.
Throughout Japan’s modern history, the government office of
public prosecution has long held the exclusive legal power to indict. After
World War II, in 1948, the Allied forces led by the U.S. government tried
to weaken the prosecutor’s dominant role in the criminal investigative and
adjudicatory process by introducing a citizen’s panel to review the
government’s decisions on prosecutorial matters. 6 If the prosecutor
decided not to indict a suspect in a criminal case, the victim of the crime
or the victim’s proxy may demand a hearing regarding the prosecutorial
decision. The PRC, which is composed of eleven citizens chosen at
random from local voter registration, conducts this hearing.7 If the PRC
decides that the indictment is the proper criminal disposition in the given
case, it delivers a written recommendation to the Prosecutors Office.
Since prosecutors held the exclusive authority to indict, the PRC
recommendations were regarded as merely advisory rather than legally
binding, and Japanese prosecutions often disregarded the
recommendations.8
In the Akashi Stampede incident, two separate review
commissions recommended prosecution of the former police officer.
Those decisions were made prior to the enactment of the new PRC Law in
2009. After brief investigations in both instances, the prosecutors
dismissed the PRC recommendations and announced their non-indictment
decisions.9 After the new PRC Law took effect in May 2009, the families
of victims resubmitted a complaint to the local PRC which once again
deliberated on the case. In January 2010, its second deliberation reversed
the previous decision not to prosecute and finally forced the prosecutors to
begin their prosecutorial proceeding against the former police officer.10
5

See discussion infra Part II.B.
See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
7
Kensatsu Shinsakai Hō [Prosecutorial Review Commission Law], Law No. 147 of 1948,
art. 4 [hereinafter PRC law].
8
Setsuko Kamiya, Inquest Committee: Inquest Bodies Give Public a Voice, JAPAN TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn2010092lil.
html (“Previously, their [PRC] rulings were only recommendations to prosecutors.”);
Editorial, Keeping an Eye on Prosecution, JAPAN TIMES, May 19, 2009,
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20090519a1.html (“Before the law revision . . .
public prosecutors often decided not to indict suspects after a second investigation.”).
9
Ex-police Officer, supra note 1.
10
Ex-police Official Indicted over Stampede Under New Inquest System, JAPAN TODAY,
Apr. 26, 2010, http://www.japantoday.com/category/crime/view/ex-police-officialindicted-over-stampede-under-new-inquest-system.
6
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The refusal of the government to facilitate the prosecution of a
select group of the privileged elites, despite their egregious conduct, has
been well documented throughout Japan’s modern history. Even today,
both unethical conduct and outright illegal activities by high-ranking
government officers are not subjected to prosecutorial scrutiny, indictment,
or trial. Similarly, police officers and prosecutors have not been properly
punished for the lengthy detention of innocent civilians and the use of
physical and psychological torture during interrogation.11
This paper argues that the new binding power bestowed upon the
PRC can exert a significant authority over, and insert public sentiments
and equitable judgments into, prosecutorial decisions on politically
sensitive cases or controversial issues that may affect the broader public
interest. In addition, the PRC can help expose the fortified terrain of
special protection and immunity given by the Japanese government to
influential political heavyweights, high-ranking bureaucrats, and business
elites. A single civic complaint by victims or their proxies in the PRC can
initiate a public hearing to review incidents or alleged crimes committed
by individuals whom the Japanese government did not indict.
Part II of this article examines the history of the PRC, reviews its
power to examine the propriety of the prosecutor’s non-indictment
decision, and reveals the important civic function it performs in
incorporating public voices into the deliberation of criminal cases. Part III
provides analysis of two recent PRC decisions and the patterns in their
deliberation and decision that may influence the conduct of public officers
and governmental bureaucrats, forcing decision-making to be more
transparent and accountable. These two PRC cases involved: (1) the
Akashi Stampede incident; and (2) the Fukuchiyama-Line derailment
accident, both of which took place in Hyogo Prefecture in southern Japan.
Part IV presents the results of recent surveys and interviews of
former PRC members. The preliminary results of these studies were first
published in an earlier paper of mine, which conducted a cross-national
comparison of the legal experiences of Japanese and American jurors.
Here, to provide some empirical insight into the PRC, I summarize the
key findings of these studies, which examined PRC former members’
experiences in serving on the commission, their attitudes and opinions
towards civic legal participation, their perceptions on civic responsibilities,
11
See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi, Retrial Clears Japanese Wrongly Convicted of Child Killing:
Defendant Jailed 17 Years was Bullied to Confess, Judge Says in Acquittal, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., Mar. 27, 2010, at 3 (discovering human rights violations in forced confessions in the
criminal justice system); Tapes Show Route to ‘Confession’: Recordings of Sugaya
Interrogation Reveal Prosecutor’s Tactics, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct. 10, 2009, at 2 (having
been placed under tremendous psychological stress and torture, the innocent suspect
claimed, “I can’t forgive that prosecutor. I want him to apologize.”).
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and the weight of people’s trust and confidence in judicial institutions and
law enforcement agencies. My analysis of the interview and survey
results show that the deliberative engagement and people’s direct
participation in the decision-making process enhanced their sense of civic
engagement and social responsibility, elevated the feeling of civic
empowerment over governmental functions and decision-making, and
fostered long-lasting commitment to civic engagement and future
deliberative opportunities.
Part V examines and proposes future strategies to promote public
interests in criminal matters. It provides overall summaries of the
missions, functions, and consequences of PRC’s deliberative powers and
explores the potential boundaries of future utilization of the PRC and its
deliberative processes in furthering the effort to democratize the judiciary
and to hold the government accountable and responsible to the demands of
the public in governmental affairs.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROSECUTORIAL REVIEW
COMMISSION AND ITS OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENTAL
PROSECUTION
A.

The Original Conception and Creation

Through the joint collaborative work of the Japanese government
and the Allied forces, represented by the U.S. government, the civilian
review commission was established by the passage of the Prosecutorial
Review Commission Law on July 12, 1948.12 The PRC is the Japanese
version of an American-style grand jury system. As the leader of the
office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces (SCAP)
occupying Japan after World War II, General Douglas McArthur saw the
grand jury as an important democratic institution for engaging the public.
The first suggestion to establish the grand jury system in Japan
was included in the Proposed Revision of Code of Criminal Procedure,
authored by Captain Maniscalco of the Legal Section, Public Safety
Division of the SCAP.13 Article 227 of the proposed revised code of
criminal procedure specifically stated that “no accused shall be made to
answer (stand public action) for any crime the penalty for which may be
12

PRC law, supra note 7, art. 4.
Anna Dobrovolskaia, Japan’s Past Experiences with the Institution of Jury Service, 49
n.233 (Feb. 5, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with East Asia Law Review)
(discussing the history of revisions of implementing both the grand and petit jury system in
Japan). The paper was presented at the Inaugural East Asia Law and Society Conference
in Hong Kong in February 2010.
13
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confinement for one year or more, or for life, or an indefinite period, or
death, unless an indictment or presentment made by a grand jury.”14
Article 228 also specified, “[n]o indictment shall be found, nor shall
presentment be made, without the concurrence of at least ten jurors (of a
panel of 12).”15 However, Captain Maniscalco’s proposal was submitted
to the Japanese government as a private draft and his provision regarding
the jury system were not formally included as part of the final draft of the
official SCAP recommendation.16 Thomas L. Blackmore, who became
the first non-Japanese to pass the Japanese bar examination conducted in
Japanese and worked as Chief of Civil Affairs and Civil Liberties Branch,
Legislation, and Justice Division, Legal Section under the SCAP,
proposed a substantially different version of the U.S. grand jury system to
the Japanese government.17 His deep understanding of Japanese legal
ethos and culture was crucial to a successful negotiation with Japanese
officials. After Blakemore graduated from the University of Oklahoma, he
received a grant to study in Japan and came to Tokyo in 1939 as a student
of international law and language at Tokyo Imperial University.18 After
he passed the Japanese bar exam, he was also admitted to practice law
with full courtroom status in Japan.19 As Blakemore was highly critical of
Maniscalco’s original proposal and Maniscalco’s seemingly unilateral
imposition of the American lay participatory system onto Japanese legal
culture, his own proposal laid the foundation for the creation of the PRC
to check the prosecution’s discretion when it decides not to prosecute.20
With a strong American influence, the PRC became a hybrid
institution, adapting the American civil and criminal grand jury systems to
Japanese culture and legal milieu. This legal system mirrored America’s
civil grand jury because it examined and inspected local public offices,
including the Prosecutors Office, the police department, and local jails, to
ensure they function properly.21 Similar to the U.S. criminal grand jury,
the PRC has influence on decisions to indict, with over 150 such
committees throughout Japan.22
14

Id.
Id.
16
Id. at 50 n.240.
17
JOHN O. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 126
n.12 (1991).
18
Mary F. Pols, Thomas Blakemore Spent His Life Connecting America and Japan,
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 1, 1994, at B4 (recounting Blakemore’s life and influence on Japan).
19
HALEY, supra note 17.
20
SHIGEMITSU DANDŌ, WAGA KOKORO NO TABIJI [JOURNEYS OF MY OWN HEART] 196-31
(1986) (recounting his memories of the Japanese committee to revise the Japanese legal
institutions).
21
See generally Hiroshi Fukurai, The Proposal to Establish the System of the Federal Civil
Grand Jury in America (May 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
22
Keeping an Eye on Prosecution, supra note 8.
15
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The principal function of the commission is to empanel a group
of randomly chosen Japanese citizens to examine and review a
prosecutor’s discretion in decisions not to indict. Given the fact that
nearly 100% of all indictments lead to conviction in Japan,23 the PRC’s ex
post facto review of whether the decision not to prosecute was proper is
quite important in checking any potential prosecutorial abuse of power.
Since its creation in 1948, the PRC has examined many
controversial political cases and investigated activities related to personal
injuries, torts, and other civil matters. Not only has the PRC deliberated
on criminal cases, but they also have examined prominent white-collar
crimes and allegations of egregious governmental misconduct.24 Their
examinations have included controversial matters such as: the Minamata
mercury poisoning incidents, 25 an organ transplant from a brain dead
donor,26 thalidomide scandals,27 incidents where hemophiliacs contracted
HIV from contaminated blood products, 28 drug-induced sufferings of
millions of Japanese who contracted the Hepatitis C virus from unheated

23
See J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why the Japanese Conviction Rate so
High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 53 (2001) (“Conviction rates in Japan exceed 99 percent.”).
24
See Hiroshi Fukurai, The Rebirth of Japan’s Petit Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems:
A Cross-National Analysis of Legal Consciousness and the Lay Participatory Experience
in Japan and the U.S., 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 315, 349-353 (2007) (discussing how
Japan’s HIV contamination incident is historically rooted in the germ and biological
warfare experiments conducted by Unit 731 military doctors during WWII, who later
played prominent roles in the development of Japan’s pharmaceutical industries and the
formulation of health-related government policies).
25
See generally T. TSUBAKI & K. IRUKAYAMA, MINAMATA DISEASE: METHYLMERCURY
POISONING IN MINAMATA AND NIIGATA, JAPAN (1977) (explaining that Minamata disease
was originally caused by the release of methylmercury in the industrial wastewater from
the Chisso Corporation’s chemical factory from 1932 to 1968 and that local prefectural
and central governments did little to prevent the pollution, further exacerbating the
problem); Ass’n of Minamata Disease Victims “Shiranui” & Minamata Disease Victims’
Mutual Aid Soc’y, Statement by Minamata Victims and Supporter Groups Addressing the
Government of Japan’s Proposal to Call the Mercury Treaty the “Minamata Convention”
(Jan. 23, 2011), available at http://www.ne.jp/asahi/
kagaku/pico/mercury/INC2_NGO/Minamata_Statement_110123_en.pdf (“The Supreme
Court verdict of October 2004 established the legal responsibility of the Government of
Japan and Kumamoto prefecture for spreading Minamata disease.”);
Kensatsu shinsakai no gaiyō [Overview of the Prosecutorial Review Commission],
SAIBANSHO [COURTS IN JAPAN] (2005), http://www.courts.go.jp/kensin/seido/
sinsakai.html.
26
Fuin sareta misshitsu no giwaku: Wada kyōju no shinzō ishoku jiken [Questions Behind
Closed Doors: The Heart Transplant by Professor Wada], KI NI NARU SHIRYŌ-SHITSU
(2005), http://www.nazoo.org/misteries/wada.htm.
27
Katsuhiko Komatsu, Toriatsukai shinsa jikensū to yūmei jiken [Numbers of PRC
Deliberations and Famous Cases], http://www.macnet.or.jp/co/ok21/kensatsu5.html (last
visited Apr. 24, 2011).
28
Summaries of the Prosecutorial Review Commission, supra note 25.
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pharmaceutical products previously approved by the government,29 and
illegal campaign donations and political bribery.30
The PRC investigates these cases from behind closed doors. They
have the power to summon petitioners, their proxies, and witnesses for
examination, question prosecutors, ask them for additional information
when necessary, and seek special expert advice on a given case.31 The
investigative function only begins after a public complaint filed against a
decision by the prosecution not to indict. Individuals and civic
organizations are empowered to file these complaints to launch a first
strike against the prosecution in its assessment of criminal matters.
After assessing and deliberating on the case, the PRC then
submits one of three recommendations: (1) the non-indictment is proper;
(2) the non-indictment is improper; or (3) the indictment is proper. A
simple majority is needed for either of the first two resolutions, while a
supermajority of at least eight of the eleven votes is needed to pass the
third resolution. The PRC then delivers a written recommendation to the
Prosecutors Office. In the past, because the Prosecutors Office was the
only institution with the power to indict, the PRC’s recommendations
were regarded as advisory. This limited legal authority was finally
expanded by the 2004 PRC Act, which made PRC decisions legally
binding.32
Nonetheless, the importance of civic participation in the legal
system and PRC has not been widely communicated to Japanese
communities, suggesting that PRC duties remain virtually unknown in
Japan. For example, in a 1990 national poll by the Japanese Cabinet
Office, 68.8% of respondents had no knowledge of the PRC system or its
duties.33 Even among those with knowledge of the system, 73.8% of them
did not know who could actually be selected to sit on the commission.34
In addition to its obscurity, strict confidentiality requirements and severe
penalties imposed on PRC participants may further discourage, and even
scare away, many people from fulfilling their PRC duties.
B.
The 2004 PRC Act and the New Legally Binding
Authority
29

Fukurai, supra note 24, at 349-53.
Id. at 347-49.
31
Keiji soshōhōtō no ichibu o kaiseisuru hōritsu [Act to Revise the Code of Criminal
Procedure], Law No. 62 of 2004, art. 38, available at http://law.egov.go.jp/htmldata/S23/S23HO147.html [hereinafter PRC Act].
32
Id. art. 41(6)(1).
33
Naikakufu seifu kōhōshitsu [Cabinet Office, Public Relations], Kensatsu shinsakai seido
ni kansuru yoron chōsa [Public Opinion Poll on the PRC System], Oct. 1990, available at
http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h02/H02-10-02-15.html.
34
Id.
30
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For many decades, the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations
(JFBA) insisted that the PRC decision be given legally binding status,
instead of being treated as a mere advisement to the Japanese prosecutor.
In 1973, the JFBA created the internal investigative commission to
examine whether or not the PRC resolution should receive legally binding
authority.35 After two years of analysis and examination, the investigative
committee submitted the recommendation to the headquarters of the JFBA,
which then released its final report in 1975. 36 The final report
recommended that the second PRC decision to indict must be legally
binding. Specifically, the report recommended that first, after the PRC
decides that “the indictment was proper” or “the non-indictment was
improper,” the prosecutor is required to decide whether to maintain their
decision not to prosecute and respond to the PRC recommendation within
the three months. If the decision not to prosecute stands, the prosecutor
has to provide an explanation of their non-indictment decision to the
PRC.37 If the PRC is not convinced by the prosecutor’s explanation and
believes that the indictment was proper for the given case, its second
decision to indict is then binding.38 Prosecutors are then required to
respect the PRC decision and initiate a public action against the accused.
The JFBA report also recommended that a two-thirds majority
approve the second resolution. The report suggested a new structure for
the PRC and the replacement of the quota system with a quorum rule.
Under the existing PRC law, the deliberative forum had to consist of
eleven members. Often times, however, the forum did not meet its
required quota for attendance because PRC members had work-related
hardships, economic excuses, or other personal reasons. The JFBA report,
thus, recommended that the number of PRC members be expanded from
eleven to fifteen and that the PRC adopt a quorum rule so that the
attendance of any eleven members would constitute a quorum for full
deliberative discussions.39
The JFBA report recommended that two PRC decisions—“the
indictment is proper” and “the non-indictment is improper”—share
essentially the same legal status, and the passage of this first PRC
indictment decision requires a two-thirds vote (i.e., at least eight of eleven
votes). A second decision of “the indictment is proper,” requires a twothirds majority of the entire fifteen members, which means that at least ten
35
JAPANESE FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCATIONS, KENSATSU SHINSAKAI SEIDO NO KAISEIAN:
SONO JŪJITSU KYŌKA WO MEZASHITE [THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE PROSECUTORIAL
REVIEW COMMISSION: TO ENRICH AND STRENGTHEN] (1975).
36
Id. at 1.
37
Id. at 28-29.
38
Id. at 29.
39
Id. at 16-17.
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votes are necessary for a legally binding indictment. 40 The JFBA’s
proposals, however, were not made into law and its recommendations to
strengthen the PRC had to wait another twenty years for serious
discussion. The opportunity to revisit and possibly incorporate the JFBA
recommendations finally came in the late 1990s, when the Justice System
Reform Council (JSRC) discussed the introduction of another lay justice
institution, the lay assessor system.
The revision of the PRC law, however, was not a primary
objective of the JSRC’s discussions and was only first mentioned in
JSRC’s seventh meeting in November 1999.41 It took until April 10, 2001
for discussion on the revision of the PRC law to emerge. The JSRC, the
JFBA, the Supreme Court, and the Ministry of Justice expressed differing
strategies and opinions. JSRC members discussed making the two
resolutions— “non-indictment is improper” and “indictment is proper”—
legally binding.42 At the same time, the Ministry of Justice recommended
that only the third resolution of “indictment is proper” should be legally
binding, while the Supreme Court suggested the second resolution, “nonindictment is improper,” be binding when the decision is unanimous.
Finally, the JFBA’s view was that the third resolution should be legally
binding and subject to a two-thirds voting requirement and that PRC
members should be supported in their deliberations by a practicing
attorney.43
Although the final JSRC proposal lacked specificity regarding
revision of the PRC law, a close reading of the proposal reveals a
commitment to introducing a legal system that “reflect[s] popular will
more directly,” 44 that “grants legally binding effect to certain
resolutions,”45 and that would “enable the voices of people to be heard and
40

Id. at 18-19.
Shihōseido kaikaku shingikai: Dai 7 kai giji gaiyō [JSRC: No. 7 Proceeding Outline]
(Nov. 24 1999), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/
991126dai7.html.
42
Shihōseido kaikaku shingikai: Dai 55 kai giji gaiyō [JSRC: No. 55 Proceeding Outline]
(Apr. 10, 2001), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai55/55gaiyou.html.
43
Kensatsu shinsakai no itteino giketsu ni taishi hōteki kōsokuryoku o fuyōsuru tameno
hōsaku: Hōsō sansha no iken no hikaku [The Strategy to Provide a Legally Mandatory
Status to a Particular Resolution by the PRC: Comparisons of Three Legal Professional
Groups] (Apr. 10, 2001), available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai55/55bessi2.html [hereinafter Strategy].
44
Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council–For a Justice System to
Support Japan in the 21st Century, available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/singikai/990612_e.html (translating portions
of Kokumin no kitai ni kotaeru shihō seido [The Judicial System in Response to
Expectation of Citizens] (June 12, 2001), available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/report/ikensyo/iken-2.html).
45
Id.
41
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reflected in the management of the public prosecutors offices.”46 The Lay
Assessor/Penal Matter Investigation Committee was authorized to
undertake the establishment of the lay assessor system and the revision of
the PRC law. The Chairman of the Committee presented an outline,
suggesting that the PRC’s decision be legally binding and that a practicing
attorney be included as a legal advisor.47 Public opinion and feedback on
the Committee’s proposals and guidelines were solicited in April and May
2003.48 Many grassroots activists from the Research Group on Jury Trial
(RGJT) were encouraged to send their opinions and suggestions to the
committee website.49 As a result of greater calls for participation and
involvement, there was substantial public response. Individual citizens
complained about the failure to recruit a sufficient number of lay
participants for the commission to convene50 and the PRC’s automatic
disqualification of vision or hearing impaired candidates. 51 The
institutional response was strong as well. The JFBA and the Citizens
Committee for the Creation of a Lay Assessor System, an influential civic
group, opposed and criticized the imposition of a penalty on PRC
members for divulging case-specific information, but both strongly
supported the PRC resolution to be legally binding.52 A final proposal
was submitted and the PRC Law was revised on May 28, 2004.53
The back-and-forth maneuvers finally resulted in revision to the
PRC law, giving a PRC resolution the legally binding authority to demand
explanations for non-prosecution decisions and making explanations
mandatory if the commission recommended prosecution two times.
Specifically, the revised law created a two-step process to make a PRC
46
Id. (suggesting the need to reinforce the PRC system by expanding the volunteer officer
system).
47
Chairman Inouye submitted his outline for reform on November 11, 2003.
Kangaerareru Kensatsu Shinsakai Seido Kaisei no Gaiyo ni Tsuite [The Outline on the
PRC’s Reform to Consider] (Nov. 11, 2003), available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/dai29/29siryou1.pdf.
48
OFFICE FOR THE PROMOTION OF JUSTICE SYS. REFORM, Saiban-in Seido oyobi Kensatsu
Shinsakai Seido ni Tsuiteno Ikenboshu no Kekka ni tsuite [Results of Public Opinions on
the Lay Assessor and PRC Systems] (July 2003),
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/siryou/0307kekka.html.
49
The RGJT has a long history of advocating for the establishment of the jury system in
Japan. See Fukurai, supra note 24, at 317-20 (“The RGJT became the national center for
providing resources and jury information and organized many public forums to discuss the
introduction of the jury trial in Japan.”).
50
Id. at 327 (citing Saiban-in seido oyobi kensatsu shinsakai ni tsuiteno iken boshu no
kekka gaiyo [Resulting outlines of public opinions on the lay assessor and PRC systems] 9
(July 2003), available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/dai22/22siryou1.pdf ).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
PRC Act, supra note 31.
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resolution legally binding. When prosecutors issue a decision not to indict
in a given case and the PRC decides that indictment is in fact proper,
prosecutors are obliged to reconsider their non-indictment decision. If
prosecutors decide for a second time not to prosecute, or if they do not
indict within three months, the prosecutors will be asked to explain their
inaction or non-indictment decision to the commission.54 The PRC will
then reconsider the case and if it makes a decision to indict, this decision
becomes legally binding.55 The court appoints a lawyer to perform the
prosecution’s role until a ruling is reached,56 but the actual instruction to
investigate authorities will be entrusted to prosecutors.57
Under the revision to the PRC Law, a practicing attorney is
appointed as a “legal advisor” when the PRC decides that legal knowledge
and advice is necessary.58 This is particularly relevant to the second step
of the process, when the commission may reevaluate the prosecutors’
second decision not to indict.59
C.

The PRC Selection Procedure

The new PRC Act tries to ensure active discussion among local
residents selected for PRC duty by providing the procedural means and
selection mechanisms to achieve a broader and cross-sectional
representation of the population. While the PRC selection procedure is
quite similar to the lay assessor selection process, the electoral
commission initiates the latter procedure. For PRC selection, the
Prosecutorial Review Commission Office (PRCO), a governmental
administrative office, is responsible for the selection of PRC members.
First, the new PRC Act specifies that the director of PRCO shall
determine an approximate number of PRC members needed for the next
year, as well as a specific allocation of prospective PRC members to be
selected from each village, town, and city within the court’s jurisdiction.60
At the second selection stage, each allocation of PRC members is reported
to relevant local electoral administrative commissions. 61 Prospective
members are divided into four different reserve pools, each consisting of
at least one hundred prospective jurors.62 At this stage, based on the
54

Id. arts. 41(2)(2), 41(6)(2).
Id. art. 41(6)(1).
56
Id. art. 41(9)(1).
57
Id. art. 41(9)(3).
58
Id.
59
Id. art. 41(4) (requiring by law that the PRC has assistance of a legal advisor when
considering the second resolution of the same case).
60
Id. art. 9(1).
61
Id.
62
Id. art. 9(2).
55
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number of prospective PRC members for each geographical unit, the
election administrative commission selects PRC candidates from their
electoral register, creating “the Proposed List of PRC Candidates,” and
sends this list to the PRCO.63
Similar to the lay assessor selection procedure, once the proposed
list is created, the deceased, people with felony convictions, and residents
who do not meet the qualifications are filtered out. 64 The selected
candidates are contacted by the election administrative commission and
screened for their qualifications.65
The election administrative commission then selects a necessary number
of qualified candidates and places them in each of four PRC reserves via
lottery. 66 The specific date and place of random selection for PRC
candidates must be conducted in the presence of a district judge and a
prosecutor.67
Detailed procedures are required for a fair selection of PRC
members. Each PRC member must serve a term of six months. While lay
assessors serve for an individual case, PRC members must continue to
serve on the commission for a half-year, with about one-fourth of the
eleven members being replaced every three months. In the actual
selection of PRC members, the director of the PRCO randomly selects
five jury candidates from the first reserve by December 28th, six jury
candidates from the second reserve by March 31st, five candidates from
the third reserve by June 30th, and six candidates from the fourth reserve
by September 30th of each year.68
Once PRC members appear at the courthouse, the chief justice of
the court or the superior court judge instructs them about their duties and
administers an oath.69 A PRC foreperson is then appointed to lead the
deliberation.70 The PRC foreperson is similar to that of an American jury.
This differs from a lay assessor trial, which according to the Lay Assessor
Act does not require a deliberative leader among the lay judges, the
professional judge is assumed to take on the leadership role in deliberative
discussions.71
63

Id. art. 10(1)(2)(3).
Id. art.12(1).
65
Id. art. 12(4).
66
Id. art. 13(1).
67
Id. art. 13(2).
68
Id. art. 13(1).
69
Id. art. 16(1)(2)(3)(4).
70
Id. art. 15(1).
71
See Saiban-in no sanka suru keiji saiban ni kansuru hōritsu [Law concerning the
participation of law assessors in criminal trials], Law No. 63 of 2004 [hereinafter the Lay
Assessor Act]. Saiban-in seido is translated as “the lay assessor” or “the quasi-jury”
system. See Kent Anderson & Emma Saint, Japan’s Quasi-Jury (Saiban-in) Law: An
Annotated Translation of the Act Concerning Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal
64
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Despite some notable procedural and logistical differences
between the lay assessor and PRC selection procedures, there are also
similarities. Both systems exclude and disqualify politicians, elected
officials, and those who perform vital political and criminal justice
functions from participating. Prior to the appearance of potential
candidates at the courthouse, both selection procedures share similar
selection steps and logistical requirements for the creation of candidate
lists. Nonetheless, the major and significant difference lies in the fact that
the PRC selection does not have an equivalent to voir dire. Another
difference is that the lay assessor selection primarily relies on the district
court to administer various procedural tasks during selection. The PRC
selection procedure is administered by PRCO. PRCO provides direct or
indirect assistance in the procedural steps throughout the whole process to
select the final group of PRC members and its foreperson.
Given the lengthy commitment of PRC duty and the rigorous
selection procedures governing the preparation of the PRC candidate list
and qualified pool, the composition of PRC members may not represent
an accurate cross-section of the community. Jury research in the United
States has found significant representative disparities and social inequities
among American grand jurors on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, and
social class.72 In Japan, a preliminary study has found that Japanese PRC
members were more likely to be male and in their 40s and 50s.73 While
there is no known study that examines the demographics of PRC members,
there may be concerns about the underrepresentation of Japan’s ethnic
minorities such as Burakumins (Japan’s so called untouchables), Ainus,
Koreans, Chinese, Brazilian, and other immigrant groups from Southeast
Asia and the Middle East.74 As the same ethnic groups make up a rather
sizable segment of criminal defendants, it may be important to research
ethnic makeup and explore ethnic diversity of PRC membership.
The schematic diagram of the eight stages of PRC selection is
shown in Figure 1.
-----------Figure 1
Trials, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 233, 233-35 (2004) (overviewing and then translating
the Lay Assessor Act).
72
See generally HIROSHI FUKURAI & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE IN THE JURY BOX:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN JURY SELECTION (State Univ. of N.Y. Press, 2003).
73
Fukurai, supra note 24, at 334-36 (summarizing the research on civic participation in
Japan).
74
See generally SHEFFIELD CTR. FOR JAPANESE STUDIES, JAPAN’S MINORITIES: THE
ILLUSION OF HOMOGENEITY vii (Michael Weiner ed., 2d. ed., 2009) (seeking, in part, to
evaluate the construction of the Japanese identity and the life of minorities in
contemporary Japan).
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III. THE POWER STRUGGLES BETWEEN THE PRC AND THE
JAPANESE PROSECUTION
The Japanese prosecutors were once given the exclusive power to
issue an indictment against a suspect. The 2004 PRC Act has changed the
prosecutor’s role and has empowered the civic panel with rights to indict
suspected criminals.
The following two criminal cases received national attention
because both incidents led to the deaths and injuries of hundreds of
civilians, including children and women. The civic complaints were
submitted to the local PRCs to review the decision not to indict a group of
individuals who were allegedly responsible for the accidents. In one of
the cases, despite multiple decisions by local prosecutors not to indict and
repeated requests by victims’ families to review the propriety of the
prosecutors’ decisions, the PRC’s decision reversed the prosecutors and
led to the forced indictment of a deputy chief police officer.
A.

The Asahi Stampede Incident75

The 2010 PRC decision on the Asahi Stampede Incident set an
important precedent in Japan’s legal history. Until then, Japanese
prosecutors had routinely paid little attention to, if not ignored, the PRC’s
resolutions. The 2004 PRC Act changed the power matrix of the
relationship between the prosecution and the PRC.
In 2010, the PRC in Hyogo Prefecture recommended the
prosecution of the Deputy Chief Officer of the Akashi police station for
the injuries of 247 people and the death of eleven people, including nine
children, who were crushed to death in the stampede incident in Akashi
City in Hyogo Prefecture. Hyogo Prefecture has a total of five PRCs in its
jurisdiction: (1) the First Kobe PRC, (2) the Second Kobe PRC, (3) Itami
PRC, (4) Himeji PRC, and (5) Toyooka PRC.76 The decision of the

75
In an earlier paper, I provided an account of this incident prior to the enactment of the
new PRC law. Fukurai, supra note 24, at 345-47. In this Part, I summarize the
background facts as presented in my past paper and then describe the many developments
that have taken place since the enactment of the new PRC law.
76
Zenkoku no kensatsu shinsakai ichiran-hyō [List of All Prosecutorial Review
Commissions in Japan], SAIBANSHO [COURTS IN JAPAN], http://www.courts.go.jp/
kensin/seido/itiran.html (last visited on Apr. 24, 2010),.
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Second Kobe PRC after it deliberated on the Akashi incident forced the
Japanese prosecution to formally bring action against the police officer.
This deadly accident happened on July 21, 2001, when 130,000
people attended a fireworks display organized by the Akashi Municipal
government. After 8:30 p.m., the stampede occurred on a narrow
pedestrian bridge, which connects a train station and the shoreline where
the fireworks display took place. The incident was blamed on youths who
allegedly caused overcrowding because they had sat and watched
fireworks on the bridge.77 However, a report by the municipality revealed
that those youths actually helped rescue victims of the incident by calling
for help and moving the crowd and children to safety.78 The same report
also found the local police, the city government, and a security firm
jointly responsible for the incident because they were forewarned of a risk
of stampede when during a millennium celebration in December 2000,
nearly 3,000 people surged onto the same bridge.79 Finally, the report
faulted the Akashi police for failing to take any precautionary measures on
the bridge.80 Nevertheless, in December 2002, the Prosecutors Office did
not indict the heads of the Akashi police. Families of the victims
promptly filed an appeal of the non-indictment decision, and in April 2004,
the PRC issued an “indictment is proper” resolution, finding that two
officers failed to devise and implement precautionary measures, which
would have prevented the incident.81
Prosecutors still refused to indict and the families of victims
requested review of the second non-indictment decision. In December
2005, the PRC delivered another "indictment is proper" resolution, which
the prosecutors dismissed yet again six months later.82 The families of
victims announced in November 2006 that they would file a third appeal
of the prosecutor's non-indictment decision once the new PRC law is
enacted and a PRC’s decision can be made legally binding.83

77
Youth Suspected in Akashi Fireworks Fatal Stampede, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, July 23,
2001 (reporting the police attributed the stampede to the youth).
78
Akashi hodōkyō jiko: Gokaisareta yaneno ueno shinjitsu [The Akashi Pedestrian Bridge
Accident: The Misunderstood 'Above the Roof' Truth], KOBE SHIMBUN, Aug. 5, 2001.
79
Panel Finds City, Police at Fault in Fireworks Stampede, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Jan.
30, 2002; Hodōkyō jiko: Akashishiga hōtekisekinin hajimete meiji [Pedestrian Accident:
The City of Akashi Recognizes Its Culpability for the First Time], KOBE SHIMBUN, Feb. 11,
2002, http://www.kobe-np.co.jp/backnumber/
asagiri/0003520294.shtml.
80
Paper Sent on 12 in Overpass Disaster, DAILY YOMIURI, May 10, 2002.
81
Indictment of Cops Urged in Bridge Deaths, DAILY YOMIURI, Apr. 24, 2004.
82
Prosecutors Again Refuse to Indict Cops over Crush, DAILY YOMIURI, June 26, 2006.
83
Moto shochōra 3 dome no kiso mōshitate he [The Third Motion to be Filed to Prosecute
the Former Chief], KOBE SHIMBUN, Nov. 2, 2006, http://www.kobenp.co.jp/backnumber/asagiri/0003520186.shtml.
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On May 21, 2009, the day that new PRC law went into effect, the
families filed another appeal of the non-indictment decision and the PRC
determined, on July 30, that “indictment is proper” for the third time.84 As
the Chief of the Akashi police station died in July 2007, the PRC’s
indictment decision only covered the prosecution of the former Deputy
Chief.
The prosecutor decided, once again, after another brief
investigation, not to indict the officer in October.85
The victims of the Akashi incident filed the petition again, and on
December 7th, the PRC began to deliberate on the fourth non-indictment
decision by the prosecutors.86 The petitioner’s claim also included a
specific request for the victims to voice their opinions and issues on the
case.87 On January 8, 2010, as required by the new PRC law in cases of
disagreement with the PRC’s indictment decision, the Kobe Prosecutor’s
Office provided their explanation of the fourth non-indictment decision, as
well as their professional opinions and current position on the criminal
case.88
On January 27, 2010, after many years of review, the Kobe PRC
finally issued the second recommendation of prosecution against the
deputy officer, thereby reversing a series of previous non-indictment
decisions by the prosecutor.89 Specifically, the PRC’s recommendation
stated that former Deputy Chief of Police Kazuaki Sakaki should be
charged with professional negligence resulting in death and injury by
failing to prevent a fatal stampede.90 The Kobe PRC decision also became
the first case of automatic indictment since the revised PRC law came into
force. The three defense lawyers were appointed by the court to take on

84

Moto fukushochō 3 dome no kiso sōtō giketsu kensatsushin [The Third Time Resolution
for the Indictment is Proper for Deputy Police Officer by the Prosecutorial Review
Commission], KOBE SHIMBUN, July 30, 2009, http://www.kobenp.co.jp/backnumber/asagiri/0003520188.shtml.
85
Akashi hodōkyō jiko 4 dome fukiso: shimin kankaku mushi [Non-Prosecution Decision
for the Fourth Time Against the Former Deputy Officer of the Akashi Police: Civic
Common Sense Ignored], KOBE SHIMBUN, Oct. 5, 2009, http://www.kobenp.co.jp/backnumber/asagiri/0003520221.shtml.
86
Akashi hodōkyō jiko, kensatsu shinsakai ga saishinsa kaishi [On the Akashi Pedestrian
Bridge Case, PRC Began to Deliberate], KŌMUIN NO FUSHŌJI [PUBLIC OFFICER’S
SCANDALS] (Dec. 7, 2009, 11:29PM), http://cat.cscblog.jp/content/
0000953005.html.
87
Id.
88
Akashi hodōkyō jiko towa: Jiko wo meguru keika (2010 nen 1 gatsu) [On the Akashi
Pedestrian Bridge Case: The Incident’s Legal Process in January 2010], JIJICOM (Jan. 27,
2010), http://www.jiji.com/jc/v?p=ve_soc_jiko-akashi-kisogiketu20100127at53b.
89
Akashi hodōkyō jiko: Naze koredake jikanga kakattanoka – Izoku kaiken [Akashi
Pedestrian Incidents: Why Did It Take This Long? – Testimony of Victims’ Families],
SANKEI NEWS, Jan. 27, 2010.
90
Id.
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the role of prosecutors, initiate the criminal proceeding, and begin the
formal prosecution of the officer.91
B.

The Fukuchisen Derailment Incident

Another explosive case about the disagreement of prosecutorial
decisions and the PRC’s deliberative outcome is the 2005 train derailment
that killed 107 people and injured 555 others. Like the Akashi pedestrian
stampede accident, this massive victimization of civilians also took place
in Hyogo Prefecture. On April 25, 2005, a train on the West Japan
Railway (JR West) Fukuchiyama Line derailed. Five of the seven cars
derailed, and both the first and second cars slammed into an apartment
building near the tracks. The first car crashed into a multi-story parking
garage in the ground floor of the apartment and was compacted to half its
original length, while the second car rammed into the building wall and
was fractured into an L shape.92
This was the most serious railway accident since the 1963
Yokohama rail crash, which killed 161 and injured 120 passengers.93 The
2005 accident occurred when the Fukuchiyama Line train took a tight
curve at excessive speed and slammed into a high-rise residential complex.
The First Kobe PRC determined that the major factor in the accident was
the company’s management policy that made profits, not the safety of its
customers, the firm’s top priority.”94
On July 8, 2009, the prosecutors indicted the JR West President
Masao Yamazaki after concluding that the tragedy could have been
prevented if the curve had the Automatic Train Stop (ATS) system, which
is used to halt trains. He was indicted for professional negligence resulting
in deaths and injuries.95 Yamazaki also made the announcement, on the
same day of his indictment, that he would resign his post, although he still
remained on the JR West’s Board of Directors.
91
Akashi hodōkyō jiko: Shitei bengoshi ga kensatu kanyaku – Muzukashii kōhanka
[Akashi Pedestrian Incidents: Court Appointed Lawyers as Prosecutors – Difficult Court
Proceeding Ahead], SANKEI NEWS, Jan. 27, 2010.
92
Death Toll from Crash May Top 100, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 28, 2005,
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20050428a2.html; Train crash kills 71, injuries
441, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 26, 2005, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgibin/nn20050426a1.html; Japan Confederation of Railway Workers’ Unions, Statement on
the Train-Derailed Accident on JR West Co.’s Fukuchiyama Line (Apr. 26, 2005),
http://www.jru7.net/statement/2005/0426_accident.htm.
93
Kokutetsu tsurumi jiko [Japan Railway Tsurumi Accident], SHŌWA NO NYŪSU [NEWS IN
THE SHOWA ERA], Nov. 9, 1963, http://showa.mainichi.jp/news/1963/
11/post-2e9b.html.
94
JR West’s Actions Show Lack of Remorse, Resolve, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct. 24, 2009, at 4.
95
JR West President Indicted Over Crash, JAPAN TIMES, July 9, 2009,
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090709a1.html.
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The prosecutors also decided not to bring charges against eight
former JR West executives in charge of safety measures, three former
managers and the 23-year-old driver who was killed in the wreck.96 In
August, families of victims submitted a complaint to the PRC, indicating
that two former JR West presidents also be indicted because of their
collateral failure to install an advanced version of the ATS system at the
site.97 On October 22, the Kobe PRC decided that three past presidents of
the JR West be indicted and submitted their recommendation to the Kobe
Prosecutor’s Office. 98 On December 4, after investigative work on the
case, the Kobe prosecutors announced that they would not indict the three
former presidents, indicating that they had no direct responsibility of
instituting an advanced version of the ATS system at the curb of the
derailment.99
Meanwhile, long before a draft of the final report on the causes of
the accident was released, JR West executives were found to have been
given information relating to the derailment from the government’s
Aircraft and Railway Accidents Investigation Commission.100 The report
by a third-party investigative body on the information leak revealed that
JR West had been concerned with how it could convince the commission
and the victims’ families of its view that the accident was not
foreseeable. 101 The investigative report also indicated, “there was a
corporate culture that prioritized protection of the company’s interests
over those of the accident victims as well as public sentiment.”102
In January, victims’ families filed a complaint to the prosecutors’
non-indictment decisions against the three JR West presidents.103 On
January 19, 2010, against two former transportation managers, the Kobe
PRC decided the “the non-indictment is improper” decision and sent the

96

Id.
Amagasaki Crash Kin Push for Charges, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 22, 2009,
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090822a5.html.
98
Crash Inquest Panel: Indict Ex-JR West Heads, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009,
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20091023a1.html.
99
JR nishi no rekidai 3 shachō wo futatabi fukisoni, Takarazukasen de Kōbe hiken [NonIndictment Again for Three Past JR West Presidents, on the Takarazuka Derailment
Incident, by the Kobe Prosecutors], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Dec. 5, 2009,
http://www.asahi.com/kansai/travel/news/OSK200912050058.html.
100
Info Leak Report Criticize JR West, DAILY YOMIURI, Nov. 19, 2009, at 1.
101
Id.
102
Yoko Inoue & Ken Iguchi, Report Slams JR West’s Corporate Culture, DAILY YOMIURI,
Nov. 20, 2009, at 3.
103
Fukuchiyamasen sassenjiko: Kensatsu shinsakai izoku kara iken chōshu [Fukuchiyama
Derailment Accident: The PRC Listens to Victims’ Families]. MAINICHI SHIMBUN, Feb. 25,
2010, http://mainichi.jp/select/jiken/news/
20100225k0000e040043000c.html [hereinafter Fukuchiyamasen].
97
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recommendation to the prosecutors.104 Against three former JR West past
presidents, the PRC summoned the families of victims and solicited their
opinions on the case.105 The prosecutors were also summoned to explain
the PRC decisions based on their own investigation on the case.106
On March 26, the First Kobe PRC decided for the second time
that the three former JR West presidents be indicted for professional
negligence resulting in injury and death.107 On April 23, three courtappointed lawyers formally filed charges against the three presidents for
their failure to take railway safety measures, thereby causing the fatal train
derailment.108
The PRC has thus served as an important civic watchdog of the
Japanese government and has critically reviewed its exercise of discretion
in decisions not to indict the accused, including powerful government
officials, political heavyweights, and economic elites. How do lay
participants view their civic duties and responsibilities in examining
highly publicized cases such as the Akashi Stampede incident and
Fukuchiyama-Line derailment case? Were they overwhelmed by the civic
responsibility or able to meet the challenges of fair and equitable decision
making? What does lay participation mean to ordinary citizens who take
part in deliberations of politically contested and highly publicized cases?
The next section examines the legal consciousness of ordinary
citizens by summarizing the results of recent surveys and interviews with
former PRC members. These studies explore whether or not lay
participation in legal decision making has influenced their sense of civic
responsibility, their confidence in deliberative discussions with fellow
members, and general perceptions and attitudes about the court, the
prosecutors, and the police, as well as their own abilities to render just and
equitable decisions.

104
Moto unyu buchō fukiso wa futō [Improper Non-Prosecution for Former
Transportation Managers], Jichi Tsushin, January 29, 2010, available at
http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=201001/2010012900757.
105
Fukuchiyamasen, supra note 103.
106
Id.
107
Fukuchiyama-sen jiko: JR nishi rekidai 3 shachō no kisogiketsu: Kōbe daiichi kensatsu
[Fukuchiyama-Line Derailment Incident: Kobe PRC Decides on Indictment Against Three
JR-West Presidents], MAINICHI SHIMBUN, Mar. 26, 2010.
108
JR nishi no rekidai 3 shachō wo kyōsei kiso [Forced Indictments Against Three JR West
Presidents], SANKEI NEWS, Apr. 26, 2010.
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IV. LAY PARTICIPATION IN THE PROSECUTORIAL REVIEW
COMMISSION: EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS AND ANALYSIS
Since its inception in 1948, more than half million Japanese
citizens have participated in PRC service. 109 A large number of
participants have engaged in deliberative discussions for more than six
decades; however, did PRC participants feel comfortable with their civic
duties and responsibilities? Did the experience encourage them to
participate in other civic duties and influence their opinions and attitudes
about the criminal court and justice systems? Or more simply, did they
enjoy their experience? The following section summarizes the analytic
results of Japanese respondents with regard to their experiences of civic
legal participation in the PRC. Preliminary data and results were first
published in an earlier study of mine that conducted a cross-national
comparison of the legal experiences of Japanese and American jurors.110
Any numerical discrepancies between this Part and my previous study are
slight and as a result of updated statistical analysis.
A.

The 2005–2006 PRC Survey

The survey and interview data was collected with the assistance of
the Prosecutorial Review Commission Society.111 Two hundred twentynine members in 11 prefectural and regional offices filled out a survey
questionnaire, and follow-up interviews were conducted with those
members who were willing to do so by either telephone or in an informal
personal setting.112 A total of 137 respondents said that they reviewed and
examined actual cases and participated in deliberations. 113 The
109

Overview of the Prosecutorial Review Commission, supra note 25.
For detailed information on the methodology and analysis used to generate the results
discussed in this Part, see Fukurai, supra note 24, at 333-44.
111
Id. The Prosecutorial Review Commission Society was established in 1955 to promote
popular legal participation and publicize the importance of its duty in Japan. Currently
many regional branch offices exist all over Japan. While more than half a milliion people
have served on review commissions, not everyone automatically becomes a member of the
society. The active conduct of business of the society is only supported by members’
volunteer work. There are variations as to the extent of activities and member recruitments
among regional branches. When the JFBA asked the society members to respond to a
survey questionnaire in 2000 in one of the largest surveys ever conducted on popular legal
participation, 2,315 members completed the questionnaire. See JAPANESE FEDERATION OF
BAR ASSOCIATIONS, Kensatsu shinsa kyōkaiin ni taisuru ankēto kekka hōkokusho [The
Final Reports of the Results of JFBA Survey] (2000).
112
Fukurai, supra note 24, at 334.
113
Id.
110
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respondents answered almost seventy questions, pertaining to a variety of
topics including their willingness to participate, perceived obstacles to
legal participation, confidence in civilian legal participation and in jurors’
abilities, and fear of retaliation due to service.114 Respondents answered
theses questions with a score of 1 to 5 based on the extent of their
agreement (i.e., “1” represents strongly agree and “5” represents strongly
disagree”), but were also given the opportunity to express general views
on their legal participation and PRC service.115
The survey revealed that the majority of PRC respondents were in
their 60s and 70s, reflecting the age of the PRC Society’s members, and
that the majority of PRC members served in their 40s and 50s.116 Also,
many respondents have been in the PRC Society for a long time,
averaging over 20 years.117 Over 70% of respondents expressed support
for the introduction of the all-citizen jury system in Japan. 118 One
interesting finding from my previous study is that the respondents who
served in the Japanese grand jury share similar age and economic profiles
with American jurors.119
B.

Deliberative Experiences

In terms of deliberative experiences, all the responses tended to
reflect a positive attitude and enthusiastic opinion about lay participation,
regardless of whether the PRC members were presented with deliberative
opportunities to review and generate recommendations for actual cases.
Yet, PRC respondents who actually participated in case deliberations
tended to feel that their experiences were more positive.120 A majority of
respondents with deliberative experience (76.3%) expressed willingness to
serve on a committee in the future. The difference between PRC members
with and without deliberative experience was statistically significant,
suggesting that those with deliberative experiences are more willing to
serve again than those without experience. Despite this ex post positive
114

Id.
Id.
116
Id. at 336.
117
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reaction to the PRC, respondents were not as enthusiastic to serve
initially.121
An overwhelming majority of PRC members (96.9%) supported
the requirement of prosecutorial explanations after a decision that
indictment is in fact proper.122 However, only 53.0% of PRC members
who had meaningful deliberative experiences believed that the
participation of prosecutors would assist in the decision making
process.123 In addition, 29.1% of the PRC members with deliberative
experience also indicated that participation by Japanese prosecutors is not
necessary for reaching a decision. These findings may prove relevant for
the lay assessor system, where both professional and lay judges deliberate
together to determine the trial outcome. Surprisingly, an overwhelming
majority (97.0%) of PRC members with deliberative experiences favor the
imposition of a confidentiality rule on all PRC participants.124
C.

Perceptions about Lay Participation125

PRC members’ attitudes and perception about lay participation in
a lay justice trial were also examined. My analysis focused on the
statistical significance of differences in responses between PRC members
with and without deliberative experiences, as well as between male and
female PRC members within each group. The majority of PRC
respondents expressed their willingness to serve as lay assessors (except
PRC women without deliberative experiences). This finding is higher
than the results of a similar poll, taken at the similar period, on people’s
lay participatory enthusiasm in Japan. The 2006 national survey by the
Cabinet Office of the Japanese Government showed that, among 1,795
randomly chosen Japanese citizens, only 5.6% wanted to serve, while
15.2% indicated they were more or less willing to serve as lay
assessors.126 Those with deliberative experiences are more enthusiastic
about lay participation than those without deliberative experience and
male respondents were more willing to serve than women PRC members
at a statistically significant level (p<.05). Nearly all PRC members
121
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indicated that they would be willing to participate if it was their duty to
serve.127
The large majority of PRC members also felt that active legal
engagement by local residents in lay participation might function as an
effective deterrent against crimes in their communities, as well against
overzealous prosecutions and inequitable judgments in criminal trials.
PRC members with deliberative experience felt more strongly than those
without deliberative experience that lay participation would be a stronger
deterrent against prosecutorial bias and inequitable outcomes in court at a
statistically significant level (p<.05).
The respondents answered questions regarding work
responsibilities and whether they presented obstacles or barriers to
participation. More than three-quarters of all PRC members felt that it
would be easier for them to serve if they could pick the date of jury
service six months in advance.128 While all PRC members showed a
willingness to participate, participatory experience in deliberation led to a
higher—and statistically significant—level of participatory enthusiasm
(p<.05). In addition, the majority of both PRC groups felt that their
employers showed understanding towards jury duty.129
The survey then examined respondents’ confidence in civilians to
fulfill the responsibilities of jury duty, such as to deliver a fair verdict and
to remain objective in evaluating evidence. Male PRC members
consistently showed greater confidence than female PRC members in
laypersons’ abilities to determine both verdict and penalty and to evaluate
objectively facts and evidence despite potentially prejudicial media
reports. Male PRC members were also less likely than female PRC
members to feel overwhelmed in judging defendants and punishing them
for their crimes (p<.10). At the same time, PRC members with
deliberative experience felt less burdened by the responsibilities of lay
participation than those without deliberative experiences. 130 This
difference in perception between the two PRC groups is statistically
significant (p<.01). The majority of both PRC groups also expressed
doubts about the lay assessor system as the most appropriate adjudicative
method and fear of rendering wrongful judgments. Nevertheless, PRC
members with deliberative experiences consistently shared less fear,
uncertainty, and doubt about the risks of wrongful verdicts than those
without deliberative experiences.
The majority of both PRC groups also voiced great concern about
threats to their personal safety as a result of lay participation, possibly for
127
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fear of retaliation by the convicted defendant and/or their families and
dependents.131 While male PRC respondents with deliberative experience
showed greater confidence in their ability to make a fair judgment in such
situations than those without deliberative experience, PRC members
generally remain fearful of potential retaliation by defendants and their
families.
D.
Confidence in the Criminal Justice System and the News
Media
The survey findings are consistent with the proposition that
people with jury experience tend to show a higher level of confidence in
the system of government and justice. 132 PRC members expressed
overwhelming confidence in prosecutors and courts, regardless of any
difference in deliberative experience.133 PRC members’ confidence in
both the police and defense attorneys was considerably heightened by
participation in deliberative participation, except for female PRC members
without deliberative experience. Deliberative experience also elevated
PRC members’ confidence in lay assessors for both genders.
As compared to the high level of confidence that flowed from
PRC members’ deliberative participation, confidence in the media
remained relatively low. An interesting finding is that deliberative
experience lowered PRC women’s confidence in both newspapers and
televisions, while deliberative participation elevated the level of
confidence in public media among PRC men.
E.

Lessons from PRC Participation and Experience

Survey responses and follow-up, person-to-person interviews
revealed that many PRC members reflected on their experiences and
provided what they have learned from their participatory experience and
useful information that helped facilitate their critical review of criminal
cases, in which the Japanese prosecution exercised the discretion in
131
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decisions not to bring indictment charges. Many PRC members also
provided what had assisted them in facilitating their participatory duties
for the duration of six month
A fifty-seven-year-old, male company employee who served in
the PRC twenty-two years ago, reflected on his experience, stating that the
participatory experience “enabled me to study and learn legal problems
and issues. At the same time, it gave me a very different worldview.” A
fifty-two-year-old man, who worked on his family business and served as
a PRC member five years ago, stated, “To tell you the truth, I was
extremely nervous at the beginning. However, a pamphlet and video at
the courthouse helped me understand my duty. . . . [The participatory
experience] is something I truly cherish today, especially enabling me to
understand the structural mechanism and legal relations among the
prosecution, the court system, and the police.” A sixty-one-year-old, male
restaurant owner said, “My wife’s support was crucial as we own our own
business, which also narrowed the scope of my life-experience. This duty
expanded my knowledge and enabled me to visit different institutions and
facilities unrelated to my ordinary daily activities.” Another seventy-twoyear-old man, who served thirteen years ago, indicated, “While my life
had no direct connection to the legal world, I was ecstatic when I first read
investigative reports. With the encouragement from the PRC support staff,
I remember that I attended the second meeting with tremendous
enthusiasm.”
An eighty-five-year-old woman, who served as a PRC member
twenty-five years ago, stated, “This participatory experience helped
eliminate the strict and authoritative image of the court, enlarge the
friendship circle, and expand my vision.” A sixty-eight-year-old woman,
who served when she was twenty-six years old, stated, “I acquired a better
understanding of the function of the prosecution and police as
governmental organizations, as well as procedural formalities.” Another
fifty-eight-year-old woman, who is a homemaker and served when she
was forty-six, complained about her PRC experience, declaring, “I had
extreme difficulties in understanding the content of court records because
many specialized terminologies were used. While I tried to use the statute
books, I routinely had a headache during discussions and got me truly
exhausted.” Another seventy-six-year-old man, who was a certified tax
accountant when he served as a PRC member fifteen years ago, indicated,
“my experience as a public servant for forty years helped acquire
sufficient knowledge for the job and helped perform my duty smoothly.”
A sixty-six-year-old man who served in the Kanagawa PRC in
2001 indicated that he became the first person to serve while he worked in
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the National Defense Academy.134 Even though the first meeting failed to
create a lively deliberative atmosphere, “the active interaction of opinions
and views were common from the second meeting.”135 When asked of the
requirement that the prosecutors must explain their non-indictment
decision following the PRC decision to indict the suspect under the new
system, he stated, “The PRC has the right to know the prosecutors’
rationale for their non-prosecutorial decision. It will serve as an important
informative basis for future deliberations.” 136 A fifty-two-year-old
woman who served in the Aichi PRC twenty-two years ago stated that the
most memorable part of my PRC duty was that, “I realized the existence
of such an important participatory system, as I was totally ignorant of
it.”137 As to public knowledge on the PRC system, she said “when I tried
to talk about my experience, a few people responded by saying that ‘I
have seen it on TV,’ and I feel not many people know about the
system.”138
A sixty-nine-year-old woman, who was a company employee
when she served in the Kyoto PRC, said that the PRC experience posed “a
new challenge to the world of which I had no knowledge, though I knew
that [the experience] will definitely help me reconnect to my society, and
my involvement will bring benefits to the overall process.” Another fiftynine-year-old woman, who owned her own business when she served in
the Kyoto PRC, indicated that she was always doubtful whether or not she
was able to truly get involved in the investigative process without making
any errors. She stated, “[i]f those cases directly affect me, I will be doing
whatever necessary to solve the problems. But they are not. I felt I must
strive to do the best and study for the betterment until the day I die.” A
fifty-eight-year-old woman who owned her family business and served in
the Kyoto PRC stated that the PRC experience “helped raise my curiosity
on legal matters and I was able to incorporate and apply my common
sense knowledge to the deliberative debates, especially from the
perspective of an ordinary citizen.”
A sixty-four-year-old man, who was a company employee when
he served in the PRC, participated in the investigation of a traffic accident
case that resulted in death, indicating his realization from the deliberative
session that it “introduced many different viewpoints and opinions
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through active participation by other members, all of which helped
produce the equitable final recommendation.”
As noted, the positive responses of PRC members towards their
legal experiences and their willingness for future participation comport
with previous research findings that jury experience contributes to positive
attitudes towards the criminal justice system. 139 Despite this greater
confidence, which manifests itself in PRC members’ willingness to serve,
civilian legal participants are subject to strict confidentiality requirements
under Lay Assessor and PRC laws.140 The disclosure by lay assessors of
deliberation secrets or secrets learned during deliberation can result in
severe penalties and imprisonment as stipulated in the Lay Assessor
Act. 141 The PRC Act takes after the Lay Assessor Act in imposing
penalties and imprisonment on PRC members for disclosure of
deliberation related secrets.
It bears emphasis, however, that lay assessor participation has not
been widely publicized. As less than 20% of PRC members indicated that
lay assessor duties were widely known in their communities, the
probability that the lay duty of the prosecutorial review commission is
known and recognized in Japan is certainly low.142 To increase the public
exposure of the lay assessor system and to dispel the apprehension of
individuals selected for PRC duty, the Ministry of Justice along with the
Supreme Court and the JFBA engaged in outreach and sponsored
approximately 4,000 forums and symposiums, which attracted about
200,000 attendees.143 These efforts perhaps pale in comparison to those
undertaken prior to the first jury trial in 1928 in Japan. At the time, the
pre-war Japanese government held 3,339 nation-wide lectures and forums
to educate the public, attracting a total of 1.2 million attendees144 and
produced and distributed over 8 million copies of educational pamphlets
and materials on jury service.145 To get a sense of the magnitude and
scope of the government’s efforts in the past, it is important to note that
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only 3% of the entire Japanese population was even eligible for jury
service.146

V. DISCUSSION: FUTURE STRATEGY TO PROMOTE LAY
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENTAL DISCRETION OF
PROSECUTION
While the PRC still remains virtually unknown to the Japanese
citizenry, the binding power provided by the new PRC law has the
potential to transform this all-citizen review commission into a position of
political prominence and to enable the commission to act as an influential
legal institution. Indeed, with its binding power, the new PRC is legallyequipped with the authority, not only to review the propriety of
prosecutorial discretion, but also to reverse prosecutors' non-indictment
decisions involving misconduct or crimes committed by people in local
communities including foreign residents. For example, the PRC in
Okinawa has the potential to alter the criminal prosecution of incidents
and the crimes committed by military personnel and thus, to enable the
residents of Okinawa to gain legal and judicial independence, not only
from the military domination of the entire island, but also from Japan's
political and corporate influence.
In the past, the Japanese prosecutor was prevented from initiating
the legal prosecution of military personnel and/or their dependents, due
(1) to the secret intergovernmental agreement that prevented potential
prosecutions of certain less serious crimes committed by military
personnel; or (2) to logistical and investigative incapacities to issue an
indictment that resulted from the protected custody, which the military
provided to shield suspected soldiers from thorough investigations by
Japanese prosecutors or police.
Aside from their inability to issue a proper indictment in militaryrelated cases, Japanese prosecutors also have been reluctant to issue an
indictment in criminal cases involving powerful Japanese politicians, their
governmental allies or associates, and economic elites with deep political
clout and business influence. For example, in March 2005, a citizen
complaint was filed to review the non-indictment decision in an illegal
political donation case against then Former Vice President of the Liberal
Democratic Party, Taku Yamasaki, who stated that he received ¥50
million donation from the Japan Dentist Association (JDA) in a paper bag
and kept it in his locker for a month.147 Despite evidence of the false
146
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receipts, the JDA's director general’s admission of money delivery
instructions, and Yamasaki's own admission that he personally received
the money, the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office decided in
January 2005 not to prosecute Yamasaki. A complaint was filed to review
the non-indictment decision in March 2005.148 The Second Tokyo PRC
issued an "indictment is proper" resolution in July 2005.149 While the
prosecutors reopened the case against Yamasaki, in less than two months
they again decided not to prosecute them.150
Such prosecutorial reluctance emerged despite the fact that
investigations often revealed incontrovertible evidence that individuals of
high regards indeed had engaged in bribery, scandalous illegal political
donations, insider trading, egregious misfeasance, bid-rigging in public
construction projects, abuse of political power, or other illegal conduct
and unethical behavior.151 Many political and business elites were able to
escape indictment because Japanese prosecutors were oftentimes forced to
make politically-calculated decisions not to prosecute people of prominent
social status and power. The controversial shobun seikun (special requests
for instructions on prosecutorial steps to be taken) system of responsibility
within the Japanese prosecutor’s office, for example, has led to the
dismissal of many political cases or from the termination of further
investigation. Karel von Wolferen, who wrote The Enigma of Japanese
Powers, once stated, "Individual prosecutors … are expected, before
taking action against influential officials, ministers, Diet members or local
government leaders, to write preliminary reports for their supervisors all
the way up to the ministry of justice, and to wait for their consent."152 The
interconnected networks of the bureaucratic decision-making process
within the Japanese government often result in the outright dismissal of
the criminal charges or circumvention of the periphery of legal definitions
148
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to ensure that prosecutorial axes were laid on insignificant issues or lessimportant activities.
In many politically charged cases, it takes well-organized civic
efforts from outside the political and business establishment to force
prosecutors to issue indictments against political heavyweights. However,
there is a new and different strategy available against prosecutorial "nonaction," illustrated in the following example.
A.

Misfeasance Allegation Against Political Heavyweights153

Many public school teachers in Tokyo have been recently
dismissed by Governor Shintaro Ishihara and his officers because they
refused to salute the flag of the rising sun and sing the national anthem at
graduation and enrollment ceremonies.154 Governor Ishihara remains a
famous celebrity in Japanese politics. His deceased brother was a pop
icon for many decades and Ishihara is known to use his connections in the
media industry and influential political circles to advance his conservative
political agenda and pro-business economic policies. 155 Many school
teachers decided to protest the top-down, politically motivated directive to
stand up and face the flag and sing the national anthem, despite the
punishment that Governor Ishihara had authorized the Tokyo
Metropolitan Board of Education to impose. In 2004, 243 teachers were
punished for their disobedience156 and by March 2009, 422 schoolteachers
have been either fired or punished for their disobedience.157
Many dismissed teachers, their families, and their lawyers
organized to form a political alliance and decided to file an official
complaint with the prosecutor's office in 2004 against Governor Ishihara
and his superintendents who sit on the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of
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Education.158 However, the teachers’ demand for accountability was met
with great resistance. The teachers had to submit their complaints five
times until prosecutors finally agreed to meet them and hear their
grievance and complaints, despite the dictates of applicable criminal
procedure. Section 241(2) of Japan’s Criminal Code of Procedure
specifically requires that when a complaint or an accusation is made orally,
a police officer or public prosecutor is required to make a written
statement of such a complaint.159 More importantly, Section 242 of the
criminal code does not permit prosecutors to refuse a complaint and
thereby requires a criminal investigation and the announcement of
results.160
On December 28, 2005, after investigative deliberation, the
prosecutor announced the decision not to indict, so in February 2006, the
dismissed teachers filed a complaint with the PRC in Tokyo.161 The
Tokyo PRC deliberated the complaint and finally decided in November
2006 that the original non-indictment decision was proper, but also issued
a rebuke against Ishihara and his subordinates, suggesting their actions
were “heavy handed.”162 Meanwhile, in another civil case filed by the
dismissed teachers, on September 21, 2006, the Tokyo District Court
ordered the Tokyo Metropolitan Government to compensate the teachers
because Ishihara’s government, under the directive of the Tokyo Board of
Education, unfairly punished them.163
Despite the commission's exculpatory decision on the misfeasance
allegation of political elites and governmental heavyweights, the above
case clearly demonstrated that the PRC has the legal authority to play a
significant role in politically sensitive cases involving possible
governmental misconduct and the abuse of power by public officials. The
158
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PRC will have an equally powerful impact on the critical evaluation of
prosecutors' non-indictment decisions involving allegedly criminal
activities of military personnel and their dependents in Okinawa.
B.

Indictment of Military Personnel and Their Dependents

For cases of criminal negligence or misconduct by military
personnel in Okinawa, the local PRC can critically examine the nonindictment decisions by the prosecution. In Okinawa Prefecture, there are
three prosecutorial review commissions located on three separate islands:
(1) the Naha PRC in Naha City, Okinawa’s capital city; (2) the Hirara
PRC in the Island of Miyako; and (3) the Ishigaki PRC in the Island of
Ishigaki.164 As the major American military bases are established and
operated on the island of Okinawa, the PRC in Naha City is the primary
recipient of citizens’ complaints and grievances concerning criminal
conduct of military personnel in Okinawa.
Okinawa hosts thirty-seven of the eighty-eight American military
bases in Japan, covering a total area of 233 square kilometers and
representing 75% of the territory occupied by U.S. military facilities in
Japan.165 This is despite the fact that Okinawa represents less than 1% of
Japan's total land area. The highly concentrated placement of the
American military establishment in Okinawa has historically created a
multitude of social and legal problems, including the proliferation of
crimes committed by military personnel. Indeed Okinawa residents have
witnessed a long history of foreign soldiers, and their families stationed in
the island, victimizing the local community. The U.S.–Japanese Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA) nonetheless effectively shielded military
felons from extraterritorial application of U.S. law, thereby effectively
sidestepping Japanese law.166
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The new PRC offers the potential to ensure that military personnel
who commit heinous crimes against Okinawans will be fairly indicted and
prosecuted.167 After the Japanese prosecutors decide not to take action
against American soldiers, individual citizens can initiate an indictment by
submitting a complaint or accusatory claim to a police officer or a
prosecutor in Okinawa. As stated earlier, Section 242 of the Japanese
Criminal Code of Procedure requires that, upon receipt of a complaint or
accusation, a judicial police report is required to forward promptly the
documents and related evidence to the attention of the prosecutor. 168
Similarly, Section 260 requires that, once the prosecutor has made the
non-prosecution decision, the prosecutor must promptly notify the person
who filed the original complaint.169 Section 261 also specifies that the
prosecutor must promptly notify the reason for the non-indictment to the
individual or party who filed the original complaint or accusation of the
reason for the non-indictment decision.170
When the original complainant decides to pursue the case, he or
she then may submit a citizen’s complaint of prosecutors’ non-indictment
decision to the PRC. A judicial panel comprised of local residents chosen
at random from the local community is then empowered to examine the
merit of the complaint, summon witnesses if necessary, and deliberate on
the prosecutor’s non-indictment decision.
If the PRC’s second decision recommends indictment of military
personnel, the Japanese government must begin the criminal prosecution
of alleged American soldiers. Of course, the alleged crime committed by
military personnel must be legally classified as heinous or of material
significance, in order to support the adjudication of the lay assessor panel.
Once an American soldier is indicted, the soldier will face a lay
assessor trial, regardless of whether or not there has been an admission of
167

The PRC will have the potential to influence the prosecutorial decisions despite the
recent discovery of the secret Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that has been signed
between the Japanese and American governments. Japanese historian Shoji Niihara
discovered the 1957 secret agreement between both governments, in which the Japanese
government renounced the jurisdiction over certain criminal offenses committed by
military personnel. According to Niihara, such a bilateral agreement forced the Japanese
prosecutors from making indictment decisions in many serious crimes committed by U.S.
servicemen in the past.
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KEIJISOSHOŌHŌ [C.CRIM. PRO.] art. 242.
169
Id. art. 260 (“When a public prosecutor has instituted prosecution or made a disposition
not to institute prosecution regarding a case with respect to which a complaint, accusation
or claim has been filed, the public prosecutor shall notify the person who filed the
complaint, accusation or claim promptly.”).
170
Id. art. 261 (“If, in a case with respect to which complaint, accusation or demand has
been lodged, or disposition not to institute a public action has been made, a public
prosecutor shall, upon request, of the complainant, accuser or person who made the
demand, promptly inform them of the reasons therefore.”).

2011]

JAPAN’S PROSECUTORIAL REVIEW COMMISSIONS

35

guilt. In either case, the lay assessor panel with a differing number of
professional and lay judges will adjudicate the crime. If the solder pleads
not guilty, the judicial panel of three professional and six lay judges will
listen to witnesses, examine material or forensic evidence presented by
counsel, and evaluate any other relevant material or evidence pertinent to
the case. If the defendant pleads guilty to criminal charges, a panel of one
professional and three lay judges will then evaluate the evidence in the
case and determine the severity of the sentence.
In addition to the possible indictment of American soldiers, the
PRC can also play an equally powerful role in evaluating the involvement
of the American military headquarters in Okinawa and Japanese
governmental policies and joint military projects. Such governmental
endeavors include the construction of new installations and defense
facilities on Okinawa Island, as well as military practices and exercises
that caused health hazards and physical harm resulting in injuries to, and
even deaths of, local residents.
C.

Okinawa and Environmental Devastation

U.S. military bases and defense installations worldwide have
caused significant environmental damage and pollution to nearby areas
and surrounding regions.171 Okinawa remains no exception to the harmful
environmental effects of the military presence and routine exercises by the
armed units of the American forces on the island. In 1947, base pollutions
in Iheya led to the death of eight people from arsenic poisoning.172 Even
after the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972, oil and fuel spills
continued to cause significant environmental damages near American
bases.173 Today, local residents learn of pollution and releases of harmful
substances, only after the damages spill to the area that transcends the
171

See generally JUDY EHLEN & RUSSELL S. HARMON, THE ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS (2001).Cf. Aaron Schwabach, Environmental Damage Resulting
from the NATO Military Action in Yugoslavia, 25 COLUMBIA J. ENVTL. L. 117, 118-19
(2000) (detailing environmental damage caused by NATO’s bombing campaign of
Yugoslavia).
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Hayashi Kiminori et al., Overcoming American Military Base Pollution in Asia: Japan,
Okinawa, Philippines, THE ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL: JAPAN FOCUS,
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Hayashi-Kiminori/3185 (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
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Id; see also JOHNSON, supra note 166, at 173 (observing that the pollution was
committed without fear of liability because Article 6 of Japan and South Korea SOFAs “is
a typical and often deeply resented aspect of U.S. SOFAs and an invitation to the U.S.
military to pollute in any way it wants without fear of accountability”); Today’s U.S.
Military Bases in Okinawa,
OKINAWA SUMMIT 2000 ARCHIVES, http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/summit/a_la/
peace/beigun/index2.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2011) (describing “[e]nvironmental
pollution caused by red soil erosion and oil spills from military bases”).
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boundary of military bases and into immediate surroundings. At Kadena
Air Base, the large jet fuel spill on May 25, 2007, which lasted for four
days, provides a recent example of the massive environmental and
ecological damages nearby residential areas and districts.174
Serious environmental pollution and damage still linger at the
former military bases areas that have been returned to Okinawa by the U.S.
military.175 The former U.S. Communication Station at Onna Point, which
was returned to the Japanese government in November 1995, was found to
have an extremely high level of toxic substances, such as polychlorinated
biphenyl (PCB), cadmium, mercury, lead, and arsenic.176
Numerous U.S. armed forces in the Fukuchi Dam's reservoir have
polluted the water as a result of river crossing exercise, and thereby,
threatened the daily activities of the majority of local residents on the
island. The Fukuchi dam provides water to the 1.2 million residents of the
island. Recent investigations have found that the water has been polluted
by grenades, flares, and hundreds of paintballs used by American military
personnel in training exercises.177 In 1997, the U.S. Marines also admitted
to using depleted uranium munitions on the islands west of Kume Island
in violation of the bilateral agreement on the Law for the Regulation of
Nuclear Power in Japan.178
Despite massive pollutants left behind by old military installations
and significant environmental damages caused by training exercises of the
U.S. military, the American government remains immune from potential
prosecution or even the required restorative process necessary to remedy
the environmental devastation. Article VI of SOFA indicates that the U.S.
military does not bear any responsibility for repairing or restoring any
damage to the environment, specifying that "[t]he United States is not
obliged . . . to restore the facilities and areas to the condition in which they
were at the time they became available to the United States armed forces,
or to compensate Japan in lieu of such restoration." 179 This SOFA
provision unilaterally allows the U.S. military to damage with impunity
174
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2007), http://www.japanupdate.com/?id=7335.
178
Ui Jun, U.S. Military Bases and Environmental Problems, THE ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL:
JAPAN FOCUS, http://www.japanfocus.org/_Ui_JunU_S__Military_Bases_and_Environmental_Problems/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
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the natural environment, natural resources, and delicate tropical
ecosystems of the islands.
The new proposed construction of an offshore U.S. military base
off the coast of a small fishing village of Henoko also endangers a unique
subtropical ecosystem and the biologically diverse marine life around the
island of Okinawa. In 1996, the American government agreed to close the
much criticized Futenma Marine Corps Air Station which was located in
the middle of very dense residential areas in the city of Ginowan. The
presence of the marine airfield has posed a health hazard and safety
concern to local residents for decades. The American government has
insisted that its closure had to be contingent upon its relocation to Henoko
in northern Okinawa.180
Henoko is located in Nago City, which is the home of the old
Marine Corps base of Camp Schwab. A new, sea-based airfield facility
will be constructed, including a 2,500 meter runway built on a coral reef,
thereby eliminating potential protests from nearby residents over the
danger of serious accidents and noises.181 Henoko's surrounding reef has
been home to an endangered dugong classified in the Washington
Convention for International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES),
which requires a dugong and its habitat to be handled under the strictest of
regulations.182
After the Japanese government agreed to pay for the construction
of the new airfield and began to create seabed drilling platforms over the
coral reefs, nearly thirty thousand Okinawans and supporters from other
Japanese prefectures and international environmental groups including
Greenpeace engaged in a sit-in that temporarily halted logistical work
prior to the full-scale construction process. Some civic activists in diving
suits tried to prevent the underwater construction by acting as a barricade
to government divers and contractors hired by the state. In April 2004,
under the authority given by Naha Defense Facilities Administration
Bureau (NDFAB) under the Japan Defense Facility Administration
Agency (DFAA), the governmental agency and local companies
subcontracted by the DFAA continued to conduct extensive drilling
surveys of the military construction site, prior to the environmental
assessment required by Japanese law.
180

David Allen & Chiyomi Sumida, ‘It’s Done,’ Rumsfeld Says of Troops Realignment
Agreement for Okinawa, STARS AND STRIPES (Nov. 5, 2005),
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An underwater battle began. During the massive protest, a group
of Okinawan activists and civic groups decided to physically prevent
governmental drilling activities and underwater surveys. On numerous
occasions off the bay of Henoko, underwater activists were physically
assaulted by Japanese Self Defense Force divers. Reverend Natsume
Taira, one of the active protesters who tried to block the underwater
environmental survey, was attacked and assaulted by Japanese Self
Defense Force (JSDF) divers who turned off the oxygen valve on his
scuba air tank, causing him to nearly drown. JSDF divers and contracted
divers also attacked other protesting divers by with hammers, kicking
them, and pulling off their masks.183
The newly installed power of the PRC resolution can offer a
radically different strategy to protest and prevent this joint state-corporate
project, which is perceived as detrimental to the social and political
interests of Henoko’s local residents and other areas in Okinawa.184 For
instance, civic activists and Okinawa residents, including protesting divers,
can take full advantage of the PRC’s authority to review a prosecutor’s
decision and therefore, feel empowered to file complaints with the local
Prosecutors Office and to allege criminal behavior and felonious activities
by JSDF divers and contracted divers who were privately hired to conduct
an environmental assessment, and the private firms contracted by the
government to assist in a drilling survey of the coral reef. After a group of
activists files a complaint or accusation of criminal conduct with local
police officers or prosecutors, a prosecutor is required to make a written
statement of such a complaint or accusation, investigate the alleged
misconduct, and determine whether to file charges against the divers and
workers hired by governmental agencies and contractors.
If a politically motivated prosecutor rejects such arguments and
returns a non-indictment decision, the citizen's complaint may be
submitted to the PRC for reconsideration of the non-prosecution decision.
The PRC must then call for a hearing and summon witnesses, including
civic activists who participated in the protest, private and JSDF divers
who allegedly attacked protesting civic divers, government officers who
issued environmental surveys, and contractors who hired private divers.
183
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The PRC can also question prosecutors and ask them for any additional
evidence or information relevant to the case if necessary. A judicial panel
of eleven Okinawa residents chosen at random from the local community
can then determine whether or not the prosecutors’ exercise of discretion
in decision not to indict was a proper decision for the given case. If the
commission determines twice that the prosecution of the accused is proper,
the commission's resolution becomes legally binding and forces the
prosecutors to reverse the previous non-indictment decision. The second
recommendation also forces the prosecution to begin a formal criminal
prosecution against both government and private divers and other relevant
agencies, including private firms that provided logistical assistance to
underwater environmental surveys. In the case of a forced indictment,
Japanese prosecutors are required to work collaboratively with courtappointed lawyers in their supplementary investigations. Based on
materials and information collected from investigation, the lay assessors
can then try a suspected party that is indicted under the forced indictment
system and make a final determination on the criminal charges in question.
It may be a long, arduous path protecting Okinawans and the
environment—but the PRC provides an effective legal avenue to
challenge joint state-corporate efforts that may harm Okinawans’ interests.
D.
Potential Problems of the PRC’s Power to Review
Alleged Military Crimes
There are two major obstacles to the PRC’s ability to review and
reverse a prosecutorial decision involving military personnel and their
dependents. The first barrier is a recent phenomenon of judicial police
officers or the public prosecutor ignoring, or even rejecting, an accusation
or complaint filed by citizens. Even if the complaint or accusation were
accepted, public officers have been accused of abuse: altering the content
of the complaint to make it less significant, deliberately deciding not to act
upon it, refusing to write a formal complaint to submit to their superiors,
or requesting the original party to withdraw their complaint.185 Citizens
recently complained about the large number of neglected or ignored
complaints and accusations by Japanese prosecutors and police officers.
The following case illustrates one such incident.
In October 1999, twenty-one year old Japanese female college
student Shiori Ino was murdered by the accomplice of her ex-boyfriend
Kazuhiko Komatsu, a twenty-six year old who had a long history of
185
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stalking Ino.186 Her murder exposed a series of neglected duties and
obligations by the Saitama prefectural police, which, long before her
murder, received multiple complaints that Komatsu was stalking Ino and
her family.187
Ino was followed for ten months and implored the Saitama police
to look into her case, stating that her boyfriend was constantly stalking her
after their break-up and that his friends distributed hundreds of handouts
defaming her. In July 1999, Ino finally decided to make a formal criminal
complaint against the police for failing to look into the stalking and
harassment allegations. However, the police refused to act on the
complaint and falsified an official report to make it look as if no official
complaint had ever been filed. 188 Furthermore, after receiving the
complaint, officers at Ageo Police Station in Saitama Prefecture wrote a
final report stating Ino was merely being harassed, and thus, neglected to
do the extra work to draft a formal complaint to be submitted to their
superiors.189 An internal investigation also substantiated that three police
officers altered Ino’s criminal complaint so they would not have to pursue
the case.190
Ino’s murder added momentum to the movement to enact an antistalking law, which finally took effect in November 2000.191 Nevertheless,
the dereliction of duties by public police officers is still very common. In
2005, JFBA surveyed trial lawyers about the dereliction of duties and
obligations by police and prosecutors. More than two-thirds of lawyers
(70%) reported that police have refused to accept a complaint filed on
behalf of their clients.192 An organized effort is necessary to ensure that
police officers and prosecutors will properly review the content of a
complaint filed by individual citizens.
186
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The second barrier involves uncertainty with respect to how a
Japanese prosecutor’s initial decision not to indict an American suspect
should be interpreted within the framework of existing intergovernmental
agreements, including the SOFA and other intergovernmental protocols,
some of which still remain unearthed but may have the potential to exert
significant impact on the interpretation of the proper legal status of
American military personnel in a Japanese criminal proceeding.
Given the uncertain legal status of American military personnel, a
battle on the legal terrain may follow. The American government may
insist that the original non-indictment decision by the prosecutors’ office
should be interpreted as the Japanese government’s decision to forfeit the
further prosecution of military personnel, thereby nullifying the legality of
the PRC’s subsequent recommendation for prosecution. The Japanese
government, on the other hand, may insist that the American government
must respect the Japanese judicial system and legal culture, including the
new PRC law and the legally binding status of individual citizens’
collective decision to indict and prosecute military personnel.
In either case, legal and political contestation over the interpretive
boundaries of applicable American and Japanese laws in determining the
proper legal status of American military felons should be welcomed and
further facilitated. These debates tend to expose the unequal balance of
power embodied in intergovernmental agreements and the legal inequities
that are part of the unilateral imposition of extra-territoriality, which
operated to undercut local law and jurisdiction. Given the long history of
Okinawan residents’ victimization by the hands of American military
personnel and their dependents and the failure of the American military to
punish them properly, the PRC’s legally binding recommendation helps
create a public forum. At question are the equity of intergovernmental
agreements on the special immunities and unilateral exemption from local
prosecutorial processes, police interference, and/or other measures of legal
constraint. The public debate over the jurisdictional inequalities may also
force the American and Japanese governments to hold discussions on the
redeployment of military personnel and the reconstitution of military
facilities within Japan.

VI. CONCLUSION
Japan has had a dark history when it comes to the prosecution of
political elites, government officials, and business executives with deep
connection to political circles. A civic panel of eleven residents in Hyogo
Prefecture decided to break this mold and prosecute a deputy police chief
under the enforced indictment system of the new PRC Law, which took
effect in May 2009. The prosecution of the deputy police chief was
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followed by the PRC’s second indictment against three past presidents of
the powerful Japan Railway company. In both cases, Japanese public
prosecutors repeatedly decided not to indict political and economic elites,
despite a public outcry and strong popular demands for their prosecution.
Finally, civic complaint by victims and their families to the PRC initiated
a public hearing, and the PRC was able to review the incidents and issue
the indictments in both cases.
This Article proposes new strategies for the PRC to function as an
effective oversight institution for governmental decisions and activities in
Japan. Today’s PRC, which possesses legally binding power in its
deliberative decision, can also offer the great potential to ensure that
military personnel and Japanese government officials who commit
nefarious crimes against ordinary citizens will be fairly indicted and duly
prosecuted. After prosecutors decide not to prosecute military personnel,
a local complaint to the PRC against the non-prosecution decision can
initiate an inquiry process and allow a citizens’ panel to review, challenge,
and possibly reverse the prosecutors’ decision. The PRC’s legally binding
resolution has also become an important channel through which ordinary
people’s moral sentiments⎯their sense of justice, fairness, and
accountability—can be expressed, articulated, and reflected in the
deliberation of criminal cases.

